

Daniel Ellsberg, October 30, 1991

Note on the origins of the following memos:

An earlier form (August 30) of the September 3 memo was discussed with Roald Sagdeev and taken by him to Moscow, where he was a delegate to the Congress of Deputies; he distributed it, and parts of it were published in Iszvestia.

I took the September 21 memo with me to Moscow, having discussed it or earlier versions of it with Frank von Hippel, Roald Sagdeev, Chris Paine, Mort Halperin, Dick Garwin, John Steinbrunner and Ray Garthoff, among others. An earlier version of it had been taken to Moscow by Jerry Sanders, who distributed it to most of the people mentioned below.

On Friday, Sept. 27, I had some discussions at the USA Institute which were quite discouraging about the prospect of any Soviet initiatives along the lines I was suggesting. Doubts were even raised as to whether the armed forces, or the republics of the former USSR, were willing to get rid of all tactical weapons, or even--given budget pressures constraining conventional defenses--to maintain the No-First-Use policy announced in 1982.

I was hearing, to my intense dismay, echoes of Eisenhower's New Look policy of 1953: a warning of the possible "resuscitation of nuclear weapons" in the Soviet Union, to quote Andrei Kortunov.

The news in the early evening of the next day of Bush's package of unilateral initiatives and proposals caused a complete reversal of my mood, starting with astonishment: there had been no hint of such a possibility, then or ever, in discussions I had in Washington a few days earlier on the way to Moscow. Half or more of the items on the list of initiatives I was proposing to the Soviets had now been initiated unilaterally by Bush or proposed as bilateral goals.

About half had not: but I had little doubt that Bush had started a process that had every prospect of going much further, possibly or even probably further than he yet expected or wanted. I felt sure (despite my discussions on Friday) that Gorbachev would match Bush's initiatives, and at least in some respects go further.

It so happened I was reading Bush's speech and watching Gorbachev's taped acknowledgement in the control room of CNN in Moscow, in the company of Andrei Grachev, Gorbachev's spokesperson, who was there for a live interview. I was able to go over my Sept. 21 list of proposals with him, point by point, after marking for him the elements that Bush had already raised and those he had not.

He proposed to put my memo, and others I gave him, into the staff works at the Kremlin, and he subsequently put me in touch with his deputy, Igor Malashenko, who was a channel to the working

group under Gorbachev which was putting together a response to the Bush proposals.

The Sept. 30 memo--"Suggested Possible Response to President Bush's Initiatives"--was written Monday morning at the International Foundation's offices for a meeting that afternoon with Velikhov. We discussed it in detail for an hour; he said he agreed with everything in it, "would not add or modify anything," and promised to distribute it.

I sent this memo by FAX to Igor Malashenko, who had already read my Sept. 21 memo and other papers I had given to Grachev. When I visited Malashenko's office the next day, he told me that my Sept. 30 memo had been translated immediately into Russian (enclosed) and given to Gorbachev's aide Chernayev--as were my other papers and subsequent memos--who was heading a working group developing a response to the Bush initiatives.

The October 3 memo--"But What About US SLBMs?": A Suggested Soviet Force Structure Taking Into Account Criteria of Controllability, Cost and Crisis Stability--reflected a discussion I had on Wednesday, October 2, with Andrei Kokoshin and Andrei Kortunov at the USA Institute.

Kokoshin had expressed reservations about getting rid of the SS-18s in view of their relative controllability compared to land-mobile missiles or SLBMs. He spoke of a "new paradigm" in which reliability of control was virtually the only criterion in evaluating systems.

I questioned whether it was wise to act as if there were only one problem, and as if old concerns about stability had become invalid. But I wanted to address the issues he raised, which included the vulnerability of fixed silos in Russia--which were newly attractive to the Soviets in terms of control--in face of US SLBMs. This and subsequent memos went to them and to Velikhov, Georgi Arbatov, Alexei Arbatov, and to Malashenko/Chernyayev.

The October 4 memo--"But What About US SLBMs?": Suggested Priorities in Negotiations Affecting Force Structure--amounted to an alternative approach to the issues raised in the October 3 memo. It was an alternative--I made clear to the same list of recipients--that I personally strongly favored.

After a night's reflection, I felt I had conceded too much to the concerns raised by Kokoshin and had not expressed my own feelings strongly enough that--despite the new considerations he raised, favoring silo-basing--at the end of the negotiating process, the SS-18s and the MXes should not have survived this opportunity to get rid of them all. The October 6 memo presents my "bottom line" proposal to this end: a "double zero" getting rid of silo-busting D5 warheads as well as MIRVd land-based missiles.

Gorbachev's response to Bush on October 5 corresponded very closely to what I hoped for (though not in every case in the form of a unilateral step) except on the issues of destabilizing strategic weapons and on the ABM treaty.

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October 25, 1991

--Bush and Nobel Prize

If one believes that the Nobel Prize should be given only on the basis of standards that Martin Luther King would meet--character, philosophy, lifetime commitment, approach--then Bush would obviously not qualify, but then, neither would a number of past recipients.

By the criteria that have applied in granting the "really existing Nobel Peace Prize" Bush has earned the award as least as truly as a number of previous recipients. There is strong precedent for giving it for a singular act of peacemaking to men whose careers are otherwise more notable for militarism (Teddy Roosevelt), terrorism (Begin), wartime escalation to the point of mass murder (Kissinger), bloody revolutionary war (Le Duc Tho) or aggression (Sadat).

In other words, I argue that Bush has, for this act, earned the Nobel Prize as much as the other aggressors, terrorists and mass murderers who have received it.

Whatever one's views on how the Prize should be awarded, what precedents should be recognized or deplored, there is the separate, more important question: Was Bush's set of actions and proposals important, to be supported and followed up and pressed further, was it a potential historical turning point, or not?

--Myths of the Nuclear Age

The Nuclear Era is entering a new chapter--that of Proliferation, following the two earlier periods of American Near-Monopoly and Bipolar Superpower Arms Race. Public understanding of the Nuclear Era up till now has been marked by a number of outstanding myths, most of which have had a reassuring character: what the public wanted to believe, what should have been true.

With the transformations within the former USSR and its empire and its changed relation with the US and the rest of the world, some of these misunderstandings might seem now to make little difference, to pose little danger of contributing to risks of nuclear war. Yet if they continue to persist, they make it all the more likely that certain past errors of policy and nuclear dangers posed in the past by the nuclear superpowers will be reproduced in the thinking and behavior of new nuclear states, perhaps starting with several republics of the former USSR.

Among these myths are the beliefs:

--Nuclear weapons have never been used since Nagasaki.

--Nuclear weapons have had--and have been seen by policymakers and planners as having had--only one function: the deterrence of nuclear attack.

--In face of the reality of MAD, serious planners have seen no capability for damage-limiting, by counterforce or preemptive attacks, since the early '60's.

--First-use threats are understood to be wholly incredible and useless (or almost so), whether against nuclear opponents or non-nuclear; and they have not been made, or meant or taken seriously. Practically speaking, the US has always had a "no first use" policy (despite the rhetoric of the Eisenhower period).

--Arms control proposals, negotiations and agreements have aimed preeminently at increasing stability, and have had this effect, which has been a major goal of US policy. To the extent that instability has been increased in certain ways, this was unforeseen and undesired--inadvertent--and in no way serves US policy.

--American Presidents have all feared nuclear war above anything else, have sought to minimize its likelihood, and have all tried to end the arms and achieve substantial disarmament. Limited results to this end reflect only mutual US-USSR suspicions and Soviet intransigence about inspection and aspirations to military superiority (or at least parity).

--The US President at all times (if he survives: otherwise, his predesignated successor) is in sole control of the use of US nuclear weapons; he has not delegated this authority.

The recent breakup of the USSR has raised urgent questions whether some of these propositions--if they ever were true for the USSR (they were not for the US!)--will apply to the successor republics; or whether, on the contrary, these new states and others that may acquire nuclear weapons will follow in the actual, non-mythical pattern of the US and the Soviet Union.

Bush's unilateral actions and proposals, and Gorbachev's responses, raise the possibility that the propositions above--which do describe plausibly what nuclear policy and posture should be--could become true for these states and for other new nuclear states, and for the US as well, for the first time.

How desirable is that? What would be necessary for that to happen; what would make it more likely or practicable? What are the obstacles, and what is the likely alternative?

Monday, Oct. 28, 1991

For 46 years--since August 6, 1945--I have lived with a sense of dread that a nuclear war was genuinely possible, more so than most Americans believed.

As I read, today, in critiques after the Oakland-Berkely hills fire of a week ago, that "We are living in communities that were designed for disaster" (SF Chronicle, Oct. 28, front page article by Ramon G. McLeod: quoting Sandy Simpson of the California state fire marshal's office) I am struck by the similarities in the situation preceding this fire and the US/SU/world attitudes and actions in the nuclear era so far.

--Premonitions and detailed warnings of disaster to come (now described slightly by Bill Mandel as "to be expected" to be discovered in the post-disaster searching for blame, a process he deplores).

--"Fire prevention experts say that some of these counties have actively resisted adoption of tougher safety concepts--including those that include provisions for minimum water reserves and streets wide enough for equipment to maneuver--in their zeal to attract more growth."

"^Why do you think these counties have fought so hard against tougher rules for so long? Money, of course. They don't want to discourage anyone from building here," said Charlie Jacobs, a state Department of Forestry spokesman who works in Yuba, Placer and Nevada Counties.

"You hope that in the aftermath of a terrible disaster that maybe some of these politicians will change their hearts," he said. 'But don't bet on it.'"

--Fragility of human environment; interdependence, instability, complexity, likelihood of cascading failures..

--Unwillingness to face risks, learn lessons, recall and adapt after even major "warning" disasters... (other recent fires; Loma Prieta earthquake one year ago...); willingness to gamble (for short-term convenience, pleasure...); failure to take fairly easy precautions...

--Thus: Construction of Instability (unlike nuclear case: inadvertent, though conscious: not desired...not a threat situation); preparation for disaster; prior warnings; willingness to ignore risk or to gamble consciously; resistance to precautionary measures or actions to reduce instability. (Is there a gender divide in this case? Or are women equally guilty? Homes and children are directly at stake!)

--New communities reproducing mistakes/gambles of the old ones (Ukraine, etc.: might budget pressures even encourage reliance on nuclear weapons, first-use threats: as symbols of sovereignty, practical deterrents? The West is reluctant to give credit to Ukraine if this will subsidize a large army; but what would the West's attitude be to a Ukrainian New Look?!) (today's SF Chronicle).

October 29, Tuesday, notes:

Overall: A situation is allowed to persist--having been "constructed"--in which under certain "special circumstances" which are quite possible, a major uncontrollable catastrophe can occur. Each of the elements of these circumstances, the requisite facilitating conditions, may already have occurred in the past, though not all together; or the major ones may even have all occurred together, but without a fatal "spark"; or a lesser catastrophe may even have eventuated, a full-scale demonstration, but one that was containable due to other, even less probable special circumstances.

Moreover, some have seen all these possibilities and drawn correct inferences on the dangers. They have even written warning reports, made recommendations for averting the danger, in some cases taken every step they could to alert authorities or the public to the problem. Some of these may even have had direct access to the highest authorities and been listened to seriously: but like the others their warnings and recommendations have, in the end, been ignored or repressed.

[Note October 30: This morning's SF Chronicle has a story, "1982 Report Urged Fire Safety Changes: Wooded East Bay cities didn't follow up." by Michael Taylor. "A report that warned East Bay cities nearly 10 years ago of imminent fire danger in many of their hilly, tree-choked neighborhoods apparently fell on deaf ears. The detailed report drawn up by a panel of local fire experts and city officials for cities bordering the wildlands of the East Bay Regional Park District strongly suggested aggressive fire-prevention measures" (to avert precisely what happened Oct. 20 to precisely these cities).

"The report was prepared by the 'Blue Ribbon Urban Interface Fire Prevention Committee' after a December 1980 fire destroyed five houses in the Berkeley hills in a matter of minutes." It designated a "very critical fire risk area" defined by "the danger of fire spreading from the wildland areas into the adjoining heavily populated area", including Hiller Highlands and other areas of Oakland that were just destroyed.]

In defense of this passivity in the nuclear context, it is pointed out that not only have no weapons actually exploded in 46 years, but that there are reliable and enduring reasons for this

"non-use." But these reasons operate specifically under "normal conditions," conditions that prevail most of the time even during limited wars.

But I have lived with a sense or awareness that there were a number of configurations of circumstances in which the choice of initiating nuclear war has been and might again be considered seriously, and in which such a decision might be made and carried out:

1) Faced with an imminent prospect of a major conventional defeat--or a prolonged stalemate--or great loss of life (e.g. by chemical weapons) at the hands of an opponent that lacked nuclear arms (though it had nuclear-armed allies).

2) A result of decisions made during an altered state of consciousness: a crisis (an altered state of consciousness almost by definition, involving fear, desperation, frequently anger/fury/rage at a prior slight or humiliation or potential embarrassment perhaps inflicted in an attempt at a fait accompli, extreme fatigue, constricted advice and consultation, surprise and disorientation...); a false alarm; a nuclear accident; a rapidly escalating war, especially a limited nuclear war. Under these decisions a decision to "go nuclear" may be made either by highest authorities or be "unauthorized". Likewise, decisions on alerts, threats, preparations, deployments, that facilitate or provoke later decisions--at high levels or unauthorized--to go nuclear.

3) Faced with an imminent possibility--with or without a tactical warning, false or not--of an attack by nuclear weapons: with the possibility of reducing damage by preempting. (For example, a prolonged false alarm during a crisis or limited war between two nuclear-armed opponents, especially when both have major preemptive capability).

4) After a nuclear threat has been made, and evidently defied.

5) In the course of a civil or international war in which both sides are armed with nuclear weapons. (This has never arisen, but could arise within or between Soviet republics, if they retain control of tactical nuclear weapons).

Most of the public and even the Establishment never understood the motives and attitudes or policies that made any of these contingencies possible or that, under the given circumstances, might lead to an "execute" decision. Nor were they aware how close that decision had actually come in a number of cases. They were not wrong to believe that nuclear war was quite unlikely under circumstances that prevailed most of the time, even during wars. But they were ignorant of the possibility and likelihood--neither high nor negligibly low--of circumstances that could abruptly raise that short-run probability of nuclear attack.

Thus, they were not concerned about, or even aware of, the way in which current policies contributed to and maintained these possibilities, or how the danger could be reduced, or the motives and interests that resisted efforts to change policy and reduce the danger.

Meanwhile, over most of the last dozen years, the course of the arms race on both sides considerably magnified some of these dangers (especially (3), "instability"); this tendency is now being challenged and may be eliminated though neither side has yet taken actual steps to eliminate or even decisively reduce the problem. But other, new dangers (5) are now coming into view, and the prospect of proliferation may soon recreate all the other dangers outside the context of superpower conflict.

Unless the superpowers transform quickly the views they hold and promulgate about the functions of nuclear weapons, the views they have acted upon until now are likely to reappear in the thinking, posture and practices of new nuclear states, starting with nuclear-armed republics of the former USSR and spreading to others, reproducing past hidden dangers of patiently-constructed yet unforeseen catastrophe.

See article by Steve Coll, Wash Post weekly Oct 7-13, 1991: "In India and Pakistan, the Nuclear Trigger Still Gleams." Not only are both sides nuclear-armed, and conducting for years "military exercises carried out by rival Indian and Pakistani generals who threaten regularly to turn their border maneuvers into sudden, fearsome war" but both are seriously considering role of nucs in their war plans, with unrealistic assumptions about consequences.

Moreover, both are relying (like Israel) on policy of ambiguity, which prevents public discussion of strategy and policy. And Paks are relying on threat of nuclear escalation as their main deterrent against a major conventional Indian attack. "One senior Pakistani military officer facetiously calls this the 'mad Muslim theory of deterrence.' He suggests that India's generals, steeped in paranoia about the willingness of Pakistan's hard-line Islamic generals to go nuclear, would hold off from any serious conventional attack."

[IMITATION OF "MADMAN THEORY". SEE ISRAEL'S SAMSON OPTION, CRAZY STATES: HERSH. HERSH ON MY INFLUENCE ON NIXON/HAK MADMAN THEORY IN 1969 AND LATER. DULLES AND BRINKMANSHIP; AND ACTUAL THREATS. ACTUAL ATTITUDES ON NUCLEARS, AS ON QUEMOY: MAD ENOUGH. AND PURSUIT OF DAMAGE-LIMITING, MIRVS... RISK-TAKING IN CUBA. RELIANCE ON THREAT OF UNAUTHORIZED ACTION, IN CUBA AND NATO. CONTROL PROBLEMS IN SOVIET REPUBLICS IN FUTURE, AS BASIS FOR CREDIBILITY OF THREATS. THREATS ARE CREDIBLE, TO THOSE--LIKE ME, OR MCNAMARA--WHO KNOW REAL CONTROL PROBLEMS AND PAST ATTITUDES AND THREATS...

BUSH IS ACTING NOW AS THOUGH RISKS OF CONTROL BY "WRONG SORT" ARE REALLY SERIOUS; HE MAY KNOW SOMETHING ABOUT THIS, JUST AS MCNAMARA WORRIED ABOUT LOSS OF SOVIET CONTROL IN CUBA.]

Wash Post editorial, "September Surprise": "Clearly Mr. Bush has in mind pressuring the Soviets to eliminate these weapons too while there is time."

(Note unfamiliar form of "pressure"!)

"Despite the public face of calm adopted by the administration concerning command and control of Soviet nuclear weapons as the country began to break up, there was much more uneasiness about the dangers than was ever openly expressed."

[Rightly so! Compare McNamara's concern about Soviet loss of control under attack. Based, in both cases, probably upon inside knowledge of realities, especially American ones. E.g.: Could Soviet republics feel they could "afford" to lock up their nuclears in the way the Soviets may have, which leaves even the Soviets open to possibility of decapitation, though US could not have counted on this given multiplicity of Soviet command systems? (Point I made to Velikhov).

Arjun Makhijani and Milton Hoenig article in same Wash Post weekly: "A New Black Market in Nuclear Terror?"

If tac nucs and others are merely stored in SU, as in US, rather than eliminated, risk of their being sold eventually. Thus, they must be eliminated, as Gorbachev proposes.

[Consider motives revealed for Pakistan and India, Israel, and North Korea, and Iraq for nuclear programs: as "model" for Soviet republics and for other countries! What we, the US, have thought, others might think; what we have done, others might do (threaten); even damage-limiting, decapitation (see Indian scenario); and they may even have a better knowledge of US precedents, including successful ones, than the US public does.

[What will be relation of Soviet republics to the NPT?! They may not feel bound by Soviet signature, with respect to transfer. Will they sign immediately? Submit to inspection like that for Iraq? Or will they "claim the right to retain nuclear capability as existing nuclear weapons states under the treaty"?!]

[Is there really a chance to avoid Soviet nuclear weapons, components or materials from entering a global market: given breakdown in centralized authority and control, between and within republics; given the turn to "capitalism" generally, and the intense need for dollars (and possible social anomie, bitterness); given the number of buyers (including Iraq! Libya, Iran, Pakistan, parts of Yugoslavia, those with desire for revenge (!) ? Is it too

late? Is stopping this different from stopping traffic in cocaine or heroin? (How about cruise missiles, while we're at it).

[Maybe this is the time to raise idea of joint US/Soviet custody for warheads withdrawn, or international control: as Makhijani suggests. Joint financing of this effort would be easier: which could mean, US financing.

Makh: stopping nuclear weapons production plugs another source of sales of nuclear materials.

[Proposed New Paradigm: vs. Kokoshin's. New Paradigm is not Controllability; it is Disarmament, Abolition; Anti-Proliferation; including genuine stability, on the path to min det and abolition. Cooperation, not deterrence. Do we deter France, England? (But what of Status, Access, Inclusion in Club...) (Also: War; arms sales; budget; conversion...MICs, nat sec state),

(Nat sec states in Latin America and Third World really "required" for local repression, in interest of local elites, First World MICs, banks. Will we continue to support them, militarily and with arms sales, to pursue IMF policies?

If the superpowers were now--as argued here--to adopt the view that nuclear weapons have only one legitimate practical function--to deter their use by others, by posing the possibility of nuclear retaliation to nuclear attack--and to adjust their posture and policy comprehensively to this view, that would be a radical departure. Communicated to other existing and potential nuclear states not only by words but by actions, it would be an essential ingredient in an overall policy designed to discourage them from acquiring nuclear weapons or from deploying and using them in ways that imitated the past, dangerous practices of the superpowers.

Do the US and former USSR want new or potential nuclear states--including republics of the former USSR--to reproduce the real, largely secret, attitudes and practices of their own military-political apparatuses toward nuclear weapons? If not, can they continue to maintain, without radical change, the nuclear deployments and doctrines that they have manifested during and since the START negotiations?

The latter have begun to be challenged and changed by superpower leaders only with the Bush initiatives of Sept. 27 and the Gorbachev responses. Yet even these--unprecedented and radical in themselves--still exhibit major unchanged premises of the Cold War/Nuclear era. Thus, Bush's failure to renounce:

--first-use threats, in Europe or elsewhere (even as he withdrew from deployment most of the weapons intended for first-use, and as the Soviet threat to Europe disappeared);

--all first-use weapons: specifically, air-launched weapons, especially in Europe.

--silo-busting SLBMs (not even reduced): primarily, the D-5.

--essentially first-strike counterforce weapons like the B-2;

--nuclear testing

--the production of fissionable material.

For his part, Gorbachev still rejects Bush's proposal--"imbalanced," but essentially sound (though unilateral renunciation of the D5 would be equally sound)--to renounce MIRVd (and silo-busting) ICBMs.

The fact that both sides are still holding on to silo-busting weapons reflects that they have in the past, and effectively still do, clung to secret functions for nuclear weapons that go beyond the deterrence of nuclear attack (for which function, threats against "soft" targets, whether military or civilian, would be adequate).

One of these has gotten a good deal of discussion among "informed" circles, though it is not widely part of public consciousness: "extended deterrence," the defense of "informal empire" by threat of nuclear first-use and, if necessary, escalation, up to the level of first-strike.

The other remains quite esoteric even in Establishment circles, though it occupies a great deal of the attention of nuclear planners and operators, including civilian consultants at "think tanks." That is "damage limiting": reducing damage and improving the postwar power balance in the event of a nuclear war, whether it arises by surprise attack (least likely, almost negligibly probable since the early Sixties, though still posed as the basis for public fears and mobilization), by escalation as a result of extended deterrence, or by false alarm or unauthorized action on one side or the other (highly unlikely in the absence of a crisis, not so during one).

The theme of this secret concern and effort has been: "Though deterrent efforts can make--and no doubt have made--nuclear war quite unlikely, they have not made it impossible, nor can they do so. Therefore, the possibility of nuclear war must be addressed, along with the responsibility of preparing to do better rather than worse in that event. Any outcome is likely to be catastrophic, by any earlier standards; but there are distinguishable levels of catastrophe. There are, in fact, tactical, strategic, technological and doctrinal preparations that can be made that would, in particular circumstances, make a major difference in the scale of the catastrophe suffered."

In the consciousness of the planners, it has been the pursuit of these advantages in the outcome of a possible nuclear war that has driven the two-sided nuclear arms race: not concern for deterring nuclear war, the risk of which has even at times been consciously and significantly increased by these efforts.

The latter price has been only one of the costs of this feckless project: which, by inducing a two-sided effort of enormous scale, has foreseeably failed even to achieve its narrow aim of reducing the prospect of damage or of "prevailing" in the event of nuclear war.

Involving some of the best intellects in the scientific community, it has for two generations fit the strictest definitions that might be offered for an insane process, out of control: all the while proceeding on the basis of complex calculations, enormous cost and effort and high-technology expertise, determinedly rational and highly intellectualized argument and analysis, modelling, simulation, predictive procedures... ("MAD Science": not, however, in the pursuit of a strategy of MAD, but just the opposite: to ensure that "Mutual" Destruction was not Assured.)

Secret premises, goals: The possibility of decapitation (raised by Soviet control system, as shown by coup!); Preemption; delegation of authority; the possibility of unauthorized escalation or preemption; secret reconnaissance, thus ability to target enemy forces; lack of Soviet alert; softness of Soviet targets; small Soviet force size (initially); the prospect of increasing missile accuracy; the possibility of antisubmarine warfare; MIRVs; ABM; Civil Defense: fallout shelters, evacuation given warning (first strike); See MX, (Scowcroft Report: emphasizing extended deterrence); SDI; D5s; and SS-18, which Soviets are still clinging to; now, GPALS (which, if Soviets were able to imitate it, could prevent major reductions in missiles or recreate the whole race).

--There has never been any tendency to see the strategic relationship as anything but zero-sum. Despite alleged concern for stability, there has been no consideration to improving the other side's security, reducing threats to it. Has that, perhaps, changed now? The failure to include D5s in the Bush moves suggests not; but the overall initiatives imply "yes."

If so, the "deterrent" relationship has changed fundamentally. (This is suggested by quote in LAT of Oct 27 on ME: Gen Aharon Yariv, former head of Israeli intelligence, "Said after the Moscow meeting that he sense a new willingness among Arabs and Israelis to rethink their positions. "The major obstacle [in peace negotiations] has always been that it is a zero-sum game," Yariv said. "It meant that every idea on every issue was assessed in terms of 'What do I get out of this, and what does it cost me?' If we overcome that, and I think we can, then we can talk to one

another about what seemed impossible before."

Zero-sum thinking meant that no negotiation--no trading, as opposed to threatening--was possible. With Schelling's notion of mixed motives, mixed conflict/cooperation, negotiation became possible. But current situation goes beyond that, beyond negotiation, as MBG says (?).

Georgi Arbatov: "The Middle East conflict has its own origins, but the Cold War made the region one of our battlefields. We really fought a lot there. It was the old story of 'an enemy of yours is a friend of mine, a friend of yours is an enemy of mine.' {This is a relatively neglected consequence of zero-sum thinking: non-two-person.} The whole region was divided into 'your sons-of-bitches' and 'our sons-of-bitches,' as President Roosevelt used to put it. And, of course, it was a wide-open channel for arms sales.'

"Now that the Cold War is over, we should help both sides look for a solution. That is a moral obligation--after all, we aggravated the problem and made it so difficult to solve. It is also something we must do if we are to establish the 'new world order' that we have talked² about so much. We must help, we simply must."

[Michael Parks and Doyle McManus, LAT Oct 27, 1991]

How does process of reciprocal initiatives relate to this?
 "Arms control by declaration, rather than by negotiation." (LAT, Oct. 26, Robert c. Toth and Doyle McManus)